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Abstract 
In a Cournot model with differentiated products, we demonstrate that merger efficiencies 
in the form of lower marginal costs for the merging firms (the insiders) lead to higher post-
merger prices under certain conditions.  Specifically, when the degree of substitutability is 
low between the products offered by the two insiders but high between those by an insider 
and an outsider, increased merger efficiencies may exert upward rather than downward 
pressure on the prices of the merging firms.  Our results suggest that in cases where firms 
engage in quantity competition, antitrust authorities should not presume that merger 
efficiencies will necessarily mitigate the anticompetitive effects of the merger.  Prices can 
go up because of large efficiencies.   
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1. Introduction 
Mergers can create efficiencies, arising from sources such as scale economy, rationalized 
production schedule between plants, and acquisition of complementary technologies.  It is widely 
accepted by economists that lower marginal costs brought about by merger efficiencies will 
encourage firms to compete more aggressively, thus mitigating the loss of competition that may 
be caused by a merger.  As Werden (1996, p.409) has noted, “If a merger caused a reduction in 
marginal cost for the merging firms, the cost reduction would offset the anticompetitive effect of 
the merger on prices.  Indeed, if the merger reduced the marginal costs of the merging firms by a 
sufficient amount, it would cause all prices in the industry to fall.”   
Consistent with this conventional wisdom among economists, antitrust authorities typically 
associate the amount of price reduction with the magnitude of merger efficiencies.  For example, 
the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010, pp.30-31) states, “the Agencies consider whether 
cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm 
customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.”  The EC 
Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers (2004, paragraph 79) indicates that “the 
relevant benchmark in assessing efficiency claims is that consumers will not be worse off as a 
result of the merger.  For that purpose, efficiencies should be substantial…”  In Canada, the 
Competition Act contains a provision that instructs the Competition Tribunal not to block a 
merger that “has brought about or is likely to bring about gains in efficiency that will be greater 
than, and will offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening of competition that will result or 
is likely to result from the merger...” Indeed, in discussions of merger enforcement policies and 
practices it is often held as self-evident that merger efficiencies mitigate anticompetitive effects 
and exert downward pricing pressure (see, e.g., Fisher et al. 1989 and Salop 1987).   
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In this paper, we challenge the conventional wisdom that merger efficiencies in the form of 
lower marginal costs will always counteract the price increases arising from the loss of 
competition.  We do so by examining the effects of a merger in a model where firms produce 
differentiated products and compete in quantities.  The merger generates efficiencies so that the 
marginal costs of the merging firms (the insiders) are lower after the merger.  We show that an 
increase in merger efficiencies may either raise or reduce the post-merger prices of the insiders, 
depending on the degrees of substitutability among the products offered by the insiders and their 
rivals (the outsiders) as well as the number of competitors.  Specifically, increased merger 
efficiencies exert upward – rather than downward – pressure on the prices if the degree of 
substitutability is low between the two insiders but high between the insiders and outsiders, and 
the number of competitors is not too small.    
In the literature, theoretical analyses of merger efficiencies are typically conducted in the 
framework of Cournot oligopoly.1  They include Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Levin (1990), 
Cheung (1992), Froeb and Werden (1998), Motta and Vasconcelos (2005), Banal-Estañol et al. 
(2008), Amir et al. (2009), Jovanovic and Wey (2012).  All of them assume that firms produce a 
homogenous product, in which case a reduction in marginal costs after a merger always leads to 
a lower price.2  In contrast, our analysis shows that the effects of lower marginal costs depend 
critically on the degrees of product differentiation.  
This paper is organized as follows.  The model is presented in section 2, and the price effects 
of merger efficiencies are analyzed in section 3.  Sections 4 and 5 examine the overall effects of 
                                                            
1 One exception is Werden (1996), which studies merger efficiencies in a differentiated Bertrand model.   
2 In particular, Froeb and Werden (1998) derive a formula for the amount of reduction in marginal costs 
needed to prevent a merger from increasing price in a Cournot industry.  
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the merger on profits and prices, while section 6 considers the impact of merger efficiencies on 
consumer welfare.  Section 7 concludes. 
2. The Model 
Consider an industry where firms produce differentiated goods and compete in quantities.  
Initially, there are ݊	ሺ൒ 3ሻ firms.  Each firm produces one good at constant marginal cost, 
denoted by ܿ.  Then two of these firms, firm 1 and firm 2, decide to merge.   
We are interested in a situation where the merger is motivated primarily by efficiency gains.3 
Specifically, suppose the merger generates efficiency gains that reduce the marginal costs of the 
merging firms to ሺ1 െ ݁ሻܿ, where ݁ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ measures the magnitude of merger efficiencies.  The 
marginal costs of the other firms, on the other hand, are not affected by the merger.  The focus of 
our analysis will be on how the price effects of the merger are influenced by the size of ݁.4   
On the consumer side, we suppose that the demand functions are symmetric for the insiders 
and, respectively, for the outsiders.  This enables us to analyze the equilibrium behavior of the 
insiders and outsiders as two groups.  Specifically, suppose that firm ݅	ሺൌ 1,2, … , ݊ሻ faces the 
following inverse demand function: ݌௜ ൌ ܲ௜ሺܙூ, ܙ௢ሻ, where ݌௜ is the price of product ݅, ܙூ ≡
ሺݍଵ, ݍଶሻ the vector of quantities produced by the insiders (i.e., firm 1 and firm 2), and ܙ௢ ≡
ሺݍଷ, … , ݍ௡ሻ the vector of quantities produced by the outsiders (i.e., firms 3 through ݊).  We will 
                                                            
3 Geiger and Schiereck (2014) classifies the motives for mergers into three categories: the efficiency 
theory (which stipulates that mergers are motivated by efficiencies), the monopolistic collusion theory 
(which posits that mergers are executed to improve market positioning and to gain market power), and the 
agency and hubris theories (which associate mergers with agency problems or hubris of management).  
Empirical evidence for mergers motivated by efficiencies can be found in Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992), 
McGuckin and Nguyen (1995), Ollinger and Nguyen (2003), and Geiger and Schiereck (2014) 
4 In this analysis, we do not consider merger efficiencies in the form of a reduction in fixed costs because 
its implication for post-merger prices is obvious.  Provided that the number of active outsiders remains 
the same after the merger, the reduction in the insiders’ fixed costs will have no impact on post-merger 
prices of all firms.      
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use subscript ݆ to denote the partial derivative of ܲ௜ሺܙூ, ܙ௢ሻ with respective to ݍ௝.  Thus, ௝ܲ௜ (≡
߲ܲ௜ ߲ݍ௝ൗ ) indicates the responsiveness of price ݅ to a small change in the quantity of good ݆.  For 
݅ ് ݆, ௝ܲ௜ 	 measures the degree of substitutability between good ݅ and good ݆.   
The demand structure is symmetric in the sense that firms within each group have the same 
degree of substitutability when they produce the same quantity.  Moreover, we assume each 
inverse demand function is separable in its arguments.  These assumptions imply that the system 
of demand functions can be written in the following form:   
ܲଵሺܙூ, ܙ௢ሻ ൌ Ψூሺݍଵሻ ൅ Φூሺݍଶሻ ൅෍ Φைሺݍ௝ሻ
௡
௝ୀଷ
,																					ሺ1ሻ 
ܲଶሺܙூ, ܙ௢ሻ ൌ Ψூሺݍଶሻ ൅ Φூሺݍଵሻ ൅෍ Φைሺݍ௝ሻ
௡
௝ୀଷ
,																					ሺ2ሻ 
ܲ௜ሺܙூ, ܙ௢ሻ ൌ Ψைሺݍ௜ሻ ൅෍ Φைሺݍ௝ሻ௝ஷ௜ ,					݅ ൌ 3,4,… ݊																	ሺ3ሻ 
where Ψூሺݍ௜ሻ , Ψைሺݍ௜ሻ, Φூሺݍ௜ሻ and Φைሺݍ௜ሻ are twice continuously differentiable functions of ݍ௜.  
Furthermore, we assume that these functions satisfy the following assumptions.  
Assumptions 1. The goods are imperfect substitutes, that is, Ψூᇱሺݍሻ ൏ Φூᇱሺݍሻ ൏ 0, Ψூᇱሺݍሻ ൏
Φைᇱ ሺݍሻ ൏ 0 and  Ψைᇱ ሺݍሻ ൏ Φைᇱ ሺݍሻ ൏ 0. 
Assumption 2.  The marginal revenue of each firm is a decreasing function of its own quantity 
both before and after merger, that is,	2Ψூᇱሺݍሻ ൅ ݍΨூᇱᇱሺݍሻ ൏ 0， 2Ψூᇱሺݍሻ ൅ ݍΨூᇱᇱሺݍሻ ൅
ݍΦூᇱᇱሺݍሻ ൏ 0 and 2Ψைᇱ ሺݍሻ ൅ ݍΨைᇱᇱሺݍሻ ൏ 0.5 
To understand Assumption 1, observe that ௜ܲ௜ ൌ Ψூᇱ and ௝ܲ௜ ൌ Φூᇱ for the insiders (i.e., ݅, ݆ ൌ
1,2, ݅ ് ݆), and ௜ܲ௜ ൌ Ψைᇱ  and ௝ܲ௜ ൌ Φைᇱ  for the outsiders (i.e., ݅, ݆ ൌ 3,…݊, ݅ ് ݆).  Therefore, Φூᇱ 
                                                            
5 Note that the marginal revenue of the merged entity with respect to ݍ௜ (݅ ൌ 1, 2ሻ	is Ψூሺݍ௜ሻ ൅ Φூ൫ݍ௝൯ ൅
∑ Φைሺݍ௞ሻ௡௞ୀଷ ൅ ݍ௜Ψூᇱሺݍ௜ሻ ൅ ݍ௝Φூᇱሺݍ௜ሻ, where ݆ ൌ 1, 2 and ݆ ് ݅. 
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(respectively, Φைᇱ ) measures the degree of substitutability between the insiders (respectively, any 
pair of outsiders).  The degree of substitutability between an insider and an outsider is 
represented by Φைᇱ  as well.  
Since Φூሺݍሻ and Φைሺݍሻ can be different functions, this demand system admits the possibility 
that the degree of substitutability between the two insiders is different from that between an 
insider and an outsider.  This, in turn, enables us to investigate how the effects of merger 
efficiencies are influenced by the degree of substitutability between the two insiders relative to 
that between an insider and an outsider.6    
Given the symmetry in the demand system, we will focus our analysis on symmetric 
equilibriums in which the two insiders produce the same quantity and all outsiders choose the 
same output.  We will continue to use subscript ܫ to denote the variables of an insider and 
subscript ܱ those of an outsider.   
Before the merger, each firm solves the following profit-maximization problem:  
max	௤೔	ሾܲ௜ሺܙூ, ܙைሻ െ ܿሿݍ௜ .																								ሺ4ሻ 
This yields the standard first-order condition: 
		ܲ௜ ൅ ݍ௜ ௜ܲ௜ ൌ ܿ.																																								ሺ5ሻ	
We use superscript ܥ to indicate the pre-merger equilibrium.  Accordingly, ݍூ஼ and ݍை஼ denote the 
pre-merger quantity of an insider and an outsider, respectively.  Similarly, ߨூ஼ and ߨை஼ denote the 
pre-merger equilibrium profit of an insider and an outsider, respectively.  
After the merger, the insiders’ profit-maximization problem becomes  
݉ܽݔ	௤భ,	௤మ	ሾܲଵሺܙூ, ܙ௢ሻ െ ሺ1 െ ݁ሻܿሿݍଵ ൅ ሾܲଶሺܙூ, ܙ௢ሻ െ ሺ1 െ ݁ሻܿሿݍଶ.															ሺ6ሻ 
                                                            
6 In practice, one factor considered by antitrust authorities in their assessment of the unilateral effects of a 
merger is whether the products of the merging parties are close substitutes relative to those offered by 
other competitors.  See, for example, section 6.1 of the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010).     
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Note in (6) that the post-merger marginal costs of the insiders are ሺ1 െ ݁ሻܿ .  The first-order 
conditions can be written in the form: 
ܲ௜ ൅ ݍ௜ ௜ܲ௜ ൅ ݍ௝ ௜ܲ௝ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݁ሻܿ							ሺ݅, ݆ ൌ 1, 2, ݅ ് ݆ሻ.																					ሺ7ሻ 
The optimization problem and the first-order condition of an outsider are the same as (4) and (5).7  
The post-merger equilibrium quantities are then determined by (5) and (7).   
Let ݍூெ and ݍைெ denote the post-merger quantity of an insider and an outsider, respectively.  
Then (5) and (7), along with (1) – (3), imply that ݍூெ and ݍைெ are determined by the following two 
equations:   
Ψூሺݍூெሻ ൅ Φூሺݍூெሻ ൅ ሺ݊ െ 2ሻΦைሺݍைெሻ ൅ ݍூெΨூᇱሺݍூெሻ ൅ ݍூெΦூᇱሺݍூெሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݁ሻܿ;		ሺ8ሻ 
Ψைሺݍைெሻ ൅ 2Φைሺݍூெሻ ൅ ሺ݊ െ 3ሻΦைሺݍைெሻ ൅ ݍ௢ெΨைᇱ ሺݍைெሻ ൌ ܿ.																		ሺ9ሻ 
We use  ߨூெ and ߨைெ to denote the post-merger equilibrium profit of an insider and an outsider, 
respectively.  
3. Price Effects of Merger Efficiencies 
The objective of this paper is to challenge the conventional wisdom that merger efficiencies in the 
form of lower marginal costs will always mitigate the upward pricing pressure arising from a 
horizontal merger.  Hence, we start by examining the impact of merger efficiencies on the prices 
of the insiders and outsiders.  Then we will move on to analyze the overall effects of the merger 
on profits and prices in sections 4 and 5.    
We first consider the impact of merger efficiencies on equilibrium quantities.  Conducting 
comparative statics on (8) and (9), we obtain: 
߲ݍூெ
߲݁ ൌ െ
ܿሾ2Ψைᇱ ൅ ݍ௢ெΨைᇱᇱ ൅ ሺ݊ െ 3ሻΦைᇱ ሺݍைெሻሿ
ܬ 	 , ሺ10ሻ 
                                                            
7 Assumption 2 ensures that the second-order conditions of the firms’ optimization problems are satisfied 
both before and after the merger.   
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߲ݍைெ
߲݁ ൌ
2ܿΦைᇱ ሺݍூெሻ
ܬ 	,																																																														ሺ11ሻ 
Where  ܬ ≡ ሾ2ሺΨூᇱ ൅ Φூᇱሻ ൅ ݍூெሺΨூᇱᇱ ൅ Φூᇱᇱሻሿሾ2Ψைᇱ ൅ ሺ݊ െ 3ሻΦைᇱ ሺݍைெሻ ൅ ݍ௢ெΨைᇱᇱሿ െ 2ሺ݊ െ 2ሻ 
Φைᇱ ሺݍூெሻΦைᇱ ሺݍைெሻ is the Jacobian matrix associated with (8)-(9).  For simplicity, we have omitted 
the arguments in the functions Ψூሺݍூሻ, Φூሺݍூሻ and Ψைሺݍைሻ.  But we have retained the argument 
in the function Φைሺݍ௜ሻ to avoid ambiguity.   
From (10) and (11), we observe:   
Lemma 1. ߲ݍூெ ߲݁⁄ ൐ 0 and  ߲ݍைெ ߲݁⁄ ൏ 0 if and only if ܬ ൐ 0. 
Proof. The numerators of (10) and (11) are negative because 2Ψைᇱ ൅ ݍைΨைᇱᇱ ൏ 0 and Φைᇱ ൏ 0.  Hence, 
the signs of (10) and (11) are determined by the sign of ܬ, as described in Lemma 1. ■ 
Lemma 1 states that larger merger efficiencies increase the quantity of each insider but reduce 
the quantity of each outsider as long as ܬ ൐ 0 .  If ܬ ൏ 0 , on the other hand, we would have a 
perverse situation where a reduction in the marginal cost of the merged entity causes insiders to 
contract output and outsiders to expand output.  To rule out this perverse situation, we assume:8 
Assumption 3. ܬ ൐ 0. 
We are now in a position to present the core result of this paper.  
Proposition 1.  A larger ݁ leads to higher prices for the insiders if and only if  
Φூᇱሺݍூெሻ
Ψூᇱሺݍூெሻ ൏
Φைᇱ ሺݍூெሻ
Ψூᇱሺݍூெሻ ∙
2ሺ݊ െ 2ሻΦைᇱ ሺݍைெሻ
ሾ2Ψைᇱ ൅ ݍ௢ெΨைᇱᇱ ൅ ሺ݊ െ 3ሻΦைᇱ ሺݍைெሻሿ െ 1																		ሺ12ሻ 
holds in the post-merger equilibrium.  
Proof. Using (1), (10) and (11), we can show that  
                                                            
8 Recall that the main objective of this paper is to demonstrate that merger efficiencies can lead to higher 
prices.  This result would not be very convincing if it were obtained from a perverse situation where a 
lower marginal cost reduces the insiders’ quantities and increases the outsiders’ quantities.   
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߲݌ூெ
߲݁ ൌ
ܿሾ2ሺ݊ െ 2ሻΦைᇱ ሺݍூெሻΦைᇱ ሺݍைெሻ െ ሺΨூᇱ ൅ Φூᇱሻሺ2Ψைᇱ ൅ ݍ௢ெΨைᇱᇱ ൅ ሺ݊ െ 3ሻΦைᇱ ሺݍைெሻሻሿ
ܬ 	.		ሺ13ሻ 
Since ܬ ൐ 0, the sign of (13) is determined by the sign of its numerator.  The latter is positive if 
and only if (12) holds.  
Proposition 1 suggests that larger efficiencies can indeed lead to higher post-merger prices 
for the insiders under some circumstances.  A close examination of (12) indicates that this would 
arise if the degree of substitutability between the products of the two insiders, as measured by 
Φூᇱሺݍூெሻ Ψூᇱ⁄ ሺݍூெሻ, is relatively low and that between the products of an insider and an outsider, 
Φைᇱ ሺݍூெሻ Ψூᇱሺݍூெሻ⁄ , is relatively high.   
 Condition (12) is key to the understanding of Proposition 1.  To flush out the implications of 
this condition, we consider the special case of a linear demand system.  Specifically, suppose the 
inverse demand functions take the following form:  
݌ଵ ൌ ߙ െ ݍଵ െ ߛݍଶ െ ߜ෍ݍ௝
௡
௝ୀଷ
,																																		ሺ14ሻ 
݌ଶ ൌ ߙ െ ߛݍଵ െ ݍଶ െ ߜ෍ݍ௝
௡
௝ୀଷ
,																																				ሺ15ሻ 
݌௜ ൌ ߙ െ ݍ௜ െ ߜ෍ ݍ௝௝ஷ௜ 		ሺ݅ ൌ 3, 4, … , ݊ሻ,																ሺ16ሻ 
In (14)-(16), ߙ ൐ ܿ and the values of ߛ and ߜ are strictly between 0 and 1.   
Relating to the general demand functions in (1)-(3), we now have Ψூᇱ ൌ Ψைᇱ ൌ െ1,  Φூᇱ ൌ െߛ, 
and Φைᇱ ൌ െߜ.  Accordingly, ߛ measures the degree of substitutability between the two insiders 
(firms 1 and 2), while ߜ indicates the degree of substitutability between an insider and an 
outsider as well as that between any pair of outsiders.  A larger ߛ (respectively, ߜ) means that the 
goods produced by the two insiders (respectively, by an insider and an outsider) are closer 
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substitutes.  In addition, it is easy to verify that this system of linear demand functions satisfy 
Assumptions 1-3.  
Using the linear demand functions, we can obtain the closed-form solutions to the 
equilibrium quantities and prices before and after the merger. We present these and other details 
of this special case in Appendix A.   
Regarding our key condition (12), we use the linear demand functions (14)-(16) to find the 
following conditions.  
Proposition 2.  Suppose the market demand functions are linear, as represented by (14)-(16).  A 
larger ݁ leads to higher prices for the insiders if and only if  
ߛ ൏ 	 2ሺ݊ െ 2ሻߜ
ଶ
ሺ݊ െ 3ሻߜ ൅ 2 െ 1.																																					ሺ17ሻ		 
To satisfy (17), it is necessary that ߜ ൐ 1 2⁄  and  
					݊ ൐ 2 ൅ ߜሺ4ߜ െ 3ሻߜሺ2ߜ െ 1ሻ .																												ሺ18ሻ	 
Proof. Condition (17) is obtained by rewriting (12) using the linear demand system (14)-(16). 
Since ߛ ൐ 0, the right-hand side of (17) has to be positive.  To satisfy the latter, we need  
2ሺ݊ െ 2ሻߜଶ ൐ ሺ݊ െ 3ሻߜ ൅ 2.   Rearranging terms, we find 
ߜሺ2ߜ െ 1ሻ݊ ൐ 2 ൅ ߜሺ4ߜ െ 3ሻ.					ሺ19ሻ 
It can be shown that the right-hand side of (19) is strictly positive.  Hence, to satisfy (19), it is 
necessary that ߜ ൐ 1 2⁄  (to ensure that the left-hand side is positive).  Solving (19) for ݊, we 
obtain (18). 
Proposition 2 provides more clarity to the finding in Proposition 1.  It clearly shows that 
merger efficiencies exert upward pressure on the prices of the merging firms if the degree of 
substitutability is low between the two products of the insiders but high between those of an 
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insider and an outsider.  For this to occur, moreover, the number of competitors cannot be too 
small.   
To understand the intuition behind Propositions 1 and 2, rewrite the insiders’ demand 
function (14) as:   
݌ூ ൌ ߙ െ ሺ1 ൅ ߛሻݍூ െ ߜሺ݊ െ 2ሻݍை.																				ሺ20ሻ 
From (20), we can see that merger efficiencies affect the insiders’ prices through two channels.  
The first channel is through each insider’s output ݍூ.  Lemma 1 states that lower marginal costs 
induce the insiders to expand output after the merger.  This is the direct effect of merger 
efficiencies on the post-merger prices of the insiders.  The second channel is through every 
outsider’s output ݍை.  In Lemma 1, we see that larger merger efficiencies cause each outsider to 
reduce its output. This is the strategic effect arising from the fact that outputs are strategic 
substitutes.  As the insiders expand outputs in response to their lower marginal costs, the 
outsiders react by contracting their outputs.  The latter tends to push up the insiders’ prices.  
As we can see from (20), the magnitude of the direct effect decreases with the degree of 
substitutability between the two insiders (ߛ), while the aggregate of the strategic effect for all 
outsiders increases with the number of competitors ሺ݊ሻ and the degree of substitutability between 
the products of an insider and an outsider (ߜ).   Accordingly, the strategic effect dominates the 
direct effect if ݊ and ߜ are sufficiently large and ߛ is sufficiently small.  
Three points about the conditions in Proposition 2 are worth noting.  First, condition (17) 
implies that ߛ ൏ ߜ, i.e., the degree of substitutability between the insiders is smaller than that 
between an insider and an outsider.  In other words, larger merger efficiencies lead to higher 
prices only if the insiders’ products are more distant substitutes for each other than for those of 
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the outsiders.  Note that this is the type of situations where a merger would normally be 
considered as unlikely to cause price increases.9    
To expand on this point, consider the extreme case where the demands for the products of the 
two insiders are independent of each other, i.e., ߛ ൌ 0.10  In this case, the merger would not have 
any effect on quantities and prices in the absence of efficiency gains.  By the conventional 
wisdom, such a merger should not raise any competition concerns because the only motivation 
for this merger is to reap efficiency gains.  Yet in this model, such a merger will actually cause 
the prices of the merging firms to rise if ߜ ൐ 1 2⁄  and ݊ satisfies (18).  Here, the merger leads to 
higher prices because of, rather than despite of, merger efficiencies.   
Second, the positive relationship between post-merger prices and efficiencies does not arise if 
the firms produce a homogeneous good.  To be more precise, the conditions in Proposition 2 
cannot be satisfied by ߛ ൌ ߜ ൌ 1.  This is why merger efficiencies always lead to a lower price in 
the existing merger literature based on homogenous Cournot models (e.g., Farrell and Shapiro 
1990).  
Third, condition (18) does not necessarily mean that this industry is unconcentrated.  It can 
be shown that the expression on the right-hand side of (18) is decreasing in ߜ ∈ ሺ1 2⁄ , 1ሿ and is 
equal to 3 at ߜ ൌ 1.   In other words, (18) could be satisfied in an industry with only four firms 
before the merger.  
Next, we consider the effects of merger efficiencies on the outsiders’ prices.  Going back to 
the general model, we use the comparative statics results (8) and (9) to derive the following 
result.   
                                                            
9 “A merger is unlikely to generate substantial unilateral price increases if non-merging parties offer very 
close substitutes for the products offered by the merging firms” (US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 2010 
section 6.1).  
10 We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion that we consider this special case.  
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Proposition 3. A larger ݁ leads to higher prices for each outsider if and only if 
																Ψைᇱ ൅ ݍைெΨைᇱᇱ ൐ 0																																																						ሺ21ሻ 
holds in the post-merger equilibrium. 
Proof.  Using (3), (8) and (9), we find: 
߲݌ைெ
߲݁ ൌ െ
2ሺΨைᇱ ൅ ݍ௢ெΨைᇱᇱሻܿΦைᇱ ሺݍூெሻ
ܬ .								ሺ22ሻ 
Since ܬ ൐ 0 and Φைᇱ ൏ 0, (22) is positive if and only if Ψைᇱ ൅ ݍைெΨைᇱᇱ ൐ 0.    
Note that a necessary condition for (21) to hold is that Ψைᇱᇱ ൐ 0.  If Ψைᇱᇱ ൑ 0, on the other 
hand, a larger ݁ would lead to lower prices for outsiders.  This implies that in the case of linear 
demand functions (where Ψைᇱᇱ ൌ 0), larger merger efficiencies lead to lower post-merger prices 
for the outsiders. 
Intuitively, the effects of merger efficiencies on the outsiders’ prices can go either way 
because of two opposing forces implied by Lemma 1.  On the one hand, a larger ݁ reduces the 
post-merger quantity of each outsider, which tends to raise the price of an outsider.  On the other 
hand, larger merger efficiencies cause the insiders to expand output, which tends to push down 
the price of an outsider.  The net effect is, in general, ambiguous.    
It is important to note that (21) in Proposition 3 and (12) in Proposition 1 are not mutually 
exclusive.  In other words, it is possible that both conditions hold at the same time, and thus, 
larger merger efficiencies may raise the prices of both insiders and outsiders.  In section 6, we 
will present a demand system under which this can indeed occur.  
4.  Merger Profitability 
In this section, we investigate the effects of the merger on the profits of the insiders and 
outsiders.  Since we have used a Cournot model of oligopoly, our analysis would not be complete 
without addressing the merger paradox.  It is well-known in the literature that a merger is usually 
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not profitable (for the merging firms) in a homogeneous Cournot model if the merger generates 
no efficiency gains.11   In the present model, however, the merger can generally be profitable 
because of product differentiation and merger efficiencies.  Below we characterize the conditions 
under which the merger is indeed profitable. 
Differentiating an insider’s post-merger profit, we can easily confirm that ߲ߨூெ ߲݁⁄ ൐ 0; that 
is, larger merger efficiencies improve the insiders’ profitability.  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
expect that the merger should be profitable for the insiders if merger efficiencies are sufficiently 
large.    
To establish formally the above result in the general model, we need an additional 
assumption.  Recall from Lemma 1 that the quantity of an insider rises, and the quantity of an 
outsider falls, with the size of efficiencies ݁.  It is then possible that if ݁ is sufficiently large, the 
post-merger quantity of an insider could be larger than its pre-merger quantity.  In this and the 
next section, we assume that this is indeed the case at ݁ ൌ 1, that is, 
Assumption 4.  ݍூெ ൐ ݍூ஼ if ݁ ൌ 1,  
Intuitively, ݁ ൌ 1 means that each insider’s marginal cost falls to 0 after the merger.  
Therefore, if ܿ is sufficiently large to start with, a merger with ݁ ൌ 1 would confer the insiders 
such a large cost advantage that they produce larger quantities than before the merger.  Indeed, in 
the special case of linear demand functions, it is straightforward to show that Assumption 4 is 
satisfied if ܿ exceeds a certain threshold.12  
Recall that ߨூ஼ and ߨூெ denote an insider’s profit before and after the merger, respectively.  
Hence, the merger is profitable for the insiders if ߨூெ ൐ 	ߨூ஼.  
                                                            
11 See, for example, Salant, et al. (1983) and Lommerud and Sørgard (1997).   
12  See condition (A6) in Appendix A for details. 
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Proposition 4. There exists an ݁గ ∈ ሾ0, 1ሻ such that ߨூெ ൐ ߨூ஼ if ݁ ൐ ݁గ. 
Proof.  Note that an outsider’s best-response function is the same before and after the merger.  
Accordingly, (9) represents a relationship between an outsider’s quantity and an insider’s 
quantity both before and after the merger.  We solve (9) to express ݍை as a function of ݍூ, denoted 
by ݍை ൌ ݍ෤ைሺݍூሻ.  Then ݍை஼ ൌ ݍ෤ைሺݍூ஼ሻ and ݍைெ ൌ ݍ෤ைሺݍூெሻ.   Differentiating (9), we find: 
ݍ෤ைᇱ ሺݍூሻ ൌ െ 2Φை
ᇱ
Ψைᇱ ൅ ݍைΨைᇱᇱ ൅ ሺ݊ െ 3ሻΦைᇱ ൏ 0.													ሺ23ሻ							 
Assumption 4 and (23) imply that ݍைெ ൏ ݍை஼ at ݁ ൌ 1.   
To compare ߨூெ with ߨூ஼ at ݁ ൌ 1, note that ߨூெ ൌ ܲଵሺܙூெ, ܙைெሻݍூெ ൐ ܲଵሺܙூ஼, ܙைெሻݍூ஼ because  
ܙூெ is the insiders’ best response to ܙைெ.   Then ݍைெ ൏ ݍை஼ implies ܲଵሺܙூ஼, ܙைெሻݍூ஼ ൐ ܲଵሺܙூ஼, ܙை஼ሻݍூ஼ 
൐ ሾܲଵሺܙூ஼, ܙை஼ሻ െ ܿሿݍூ஼ ൌ ߨூ஼.  Hence, ߨூெ ൐ ߨூ஼ at ݁ ൌ 1.   
Differentiating ߨூெ and applying the envelope theorem, we find 
߲ߨூெ
߲݁ ൌ ܿݍூ ൅ ሺ݊ െ 2ሻΦை
ᇱ ሺݍைெሻݍ෤ைᇱ ߲ݍூ
ெ
߲݁ ൐ 0.															ሺ24ሻ 
If ߨூெ ൏ ߨூ஼ at ݁ ൌ 0, there exists a unique ݁గ ∈ ሺ0, 1ሻ such that ߨூெ ൌ ߨூ஼ at ݁ ൌ ݁గ and ߨூெ ൐
ߨூ஼ for ݁ ൐ ݁గ.  On the other hand, if ߨூெ ൐ ߨூ஼ at ݁ ൌ 0, we set ݁గ ൌ 0.  ■ 
Proposition 4 confirms the conjecture that the merger is profitable for the insiders when 
merger efficiencies are sufficiently large.  Next, we move on to consider the effects of the merger 
on the outsiders’ profits.  Recall from Lemma 1 that larger merger efficiencies cause the 
outsiders to reduce output.  Hence, we expect the post-merger profit of each outsider to fall 
below its pre-merger level if merger efficiencies are sufficiently large.  This brings us to another 
critical value of ݁.   
Lemma 2. There exists an ݁௣ ∈ ሺ݁గ, 1ሻ such that ݍூெ ൌ ݍூ஼, ݍைெ ൌ ݍை஼, ݌ூெ ൌ ݌ூ஼ and ݌ைெ ൌ ݌ை஼ at 
݁ ൌ ݁௣. 
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Proof.  Note that the left-hand side of (7) is less than that of (5) for ݍ௜ ൌ ݍ௝ ൌ ݍூ.  This implies 
that if there is no merger efficiencies (i.e., if ݁ ൌ 0), an insider’s marginal revenue after the 
merger is lower than that before the merger.  Since the best-response function of each outsider is 
the same before and after the merger, this implies that ݍூெ ൏ ݍூ஼ and ݍைெ ൐ ݍை஼ at ݁ ൌ 0.  On the 
other hand, Assumption 4 and (23) imply that ݍூெ ൐ ݍூ஼ and ݍைெ ൏ ݍை஼ at ݁ ൌ 1.  By the continuity 
of ݍூெ in ݁, there exists ݁௣ ∈ ሺ0, 1ሻ such that ݍூெ ൌ ݍூ஼.  Then (23) implies ݍைெ ൌ ݍை஼ at ݁ ൌ ݁௣.  
From the inverse demand functions (1)-(3), we infer that ݌ூெ ൌ ݌ூ஼ and ݌ைெ ൌ ݌ை஼ at ݁ ൌ ݁௣.   
In the case where ݁గ ൌ 0, ݁௣ ൐ 0 implies that ݁௣ ൐ ݁గ.  Now suppose ݁గ ൐ 0.  Note that 
ൣܲ௜ሺܙூ, ܙ௢ሻ െ ሺ1 െ ݁ሻܿ൧ݍ௜ ൐ ሾܲ௜ሺܙூ, ܙ௢ሻ െ ܿሿݍ௜ for ݁ ൐ 0.  Hence, ߨூெ ൐ ߨூ஼ at ݁ ൌ ݁௣.  
Since ߨூெ ൌ ߨூ஼ at ݁ ൌ ݁గ, (24) implies that ݁௣ ൐ ݁గ. ■ 
Lemma 2 defines a critical value of ݁ such that the equilibriums before and after the merger 
involve exactly the same quantities and prices.  Note that ݁௣ ൐ ݁గ, implying that the merger is 
profitable for the insiders even before their quantities reach their pre-merger levels.  For the 
outsiders, on the other hand, ݁௣, represents a turning point for their post-merger profits vis-à-vis 
their pre-merger levels.  
Proposition 5. ߨைெ ൏ ߨை஼ if and only if ݁ ൐ ݁௣. 
Proof.  Since (4) represents an outsider’s profit both before and after the merger, Lemma 2 
implies that ߨைெ ൌ ߨை஼ at ݁ ൌ ݁௣.  Differentiating an outsider’s post-merger profit with respect to 
݁ and applying the envelope theorem, we obtain:  
߲ߨைெ
߲݁ ൌ 2ݍை
ெΦைᇱ ሺݍூெሻ ߲ݍூ
ெ
߲݁ ൏ 0,																ሺ25ሻ 
in which ߲ݍூெ ߲݁⁄ ൐ 0 by Lemma 1.  Then (25) implies ߨைெ ൏ ߨை஼ if and only if ݁ ൐ ݁௣. ■ 
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Proposition 5 indicates that the impact of the merger on the outsiders’ profits depends on the 
size of merger efficiencies.  The outsiders benefit from the merger if efficiencies are small but 
are harmed by it if efficiencies are large.  This observation suggests that the expected impact of a 
merger on the outsiders’ profits is not a good indicator of the presence or absence of merger 
efficiencies.13   
5. Price Effects of Merger 
Recall from Proposition 1 that the prices of the insiders rise with the size of merger efficiencies 
under condition (12).  This result suggests an intriguing possibility that a merger could lead to 
lower prices when efficiencies are small but higher prices when efficiencies are large.  We 
investigate this possibility in this section. 
Lemma 2 identifies a critical level of merger efficiencies, ݁௣, around which the merger leads 
to higher insider prices if the level of efficiencies is on one side of ݁௣ and lower insider prices on 
the other side of ݁௣.  To be more specific, if ߲݌ூெ ߲݁⁄ ൏ 0 so that the insider prices decrease with 
merger efficiencies for ݁ over the entire interval ሾ0, 1ሿ, we have the familiar situation where 
efficiencies mitigate the upward pricing pressure caused by the merger.  In that case, the insiders’ 
post-merger prices will fall below their pre-merger level if the size of merger efficiencies 
exceeds ݁௣.  If ߲݌ூெ ߲݁⁄ ൐ 0 at ݁ ൌ ݁௣, on the other hand, we have the intriguing situation where 
the merger leads to lower prices when efficiencies are small but higher prices when efficiencies 
are large.  
                                                            
13 There is a literature, pioneered by Eckbo (1983), that uses the abnormal stock returns of outsiders to 
ascertain whether a merger is motivated by efficiency gains.  Schumann (1993) criticizes this approach by 
arguing that “practically any pattern of rivals’ abnormal returns can be consistent with some story of 
predominately procompetitive or anticompetitive mergers.”  Proposition 5 lends theoretical support to 
Schumann’s argument because it implies that merger efficiencies can cause the abnormal stock returns of 
outsiders to go in either direction.    
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Proposition 6.  If condition (12) holds at ݁ ൌ ݁௣, there exists an ݁௟ ∈ ሺ݁గ, ݁௣ሻ such that ݌ூெ ൏ ݌ூ஼ 
for ݁ ∈ ൫݁௟, ݁௣൯, and an ݁௛ ∈ ሺ݁௣, 1ሻ such that ݌ூெ ൐ ݌ூ஼ for ݁ ∈ ൫݁௣, ݁௛൯.  
Proof.  Recall that ݌ூெ ൌ ݌ூ஼ and ݌ைெ ൌ ݌ை஼ at ݁ ൌ ݁௣.  By Proposition 1, condition (12) implies 
that ߲݌ூெ ߲݁⁄ ൐ 0 at ݁ ൌ ݁௣.  Then the result follows from the continuity of ݌ூெ in ݁.  ■ 
It is interesting to consider the implications of Proposition 6 for merger enforcement.  In the 
literature, numerous retrospective studies have been conducted to assess the actual effects of past 
merger cases that were reviewed but not challenged by antitrust authorities in the US or 
elsewhere.14  Among these cases, at least two mergers are found to have generated efficiencies 
yet have led to higher prices.15 The conventional interpretation for such a finding is that the 
merger efficiencies were not large enough to offset the effects of increased market power 
conferred by the merger.  Proposition 6, on the other hand, suggests another possible explanation.  
That is, instead of being a mitigating factor, merger efficiencies may actually have contributed to 
the price increases.   
Therefore, Proposition 6 suggests that in cases where firms engage in quantity competition, 
antitrust authorities should not presume that merger efficiencies will necessarily counteract the 
anticompetitive effects of the merger.  The merger can lead to higher prices because of, rather 
than despite of, large efficiencies.   
                                                            
14 See Hunter et al. (2008) and Ashenfelter et al. (2014) for surveys of these studies.  
15 In the first case, SCM Corp., a producer of titanium dioxide (TiO2), acquired a manufacturing facility of 
its competitor, Gulf &Western, in 1983.  After the merger, SCM replaced the old high-cost manufacturing 
process that had been used at the Gulf & Western plant since 1964 with a proprietary low cost process.  
Despite the significant cost reduction, an econometric analysis by Schumann et al. (1992) finds that the 
merger caused the price of TiO2 to rise by more than 30% in the five-year period after the merger.  In the 
second case, two brewers, Miller and Coors, established a joint venture to combine their operations in 
2008.  According to an analysis by Ashenfelter et al. (2015), the merger increased market concentration 
and reduced shipping costs.  On average, the higher price caused by increased concentration was offset by 
a nearly equal and opposite efficiency effect.  However, estimates for individual markets show that the 
merger caused the prices to rise in 26 of the 48 markets (Ashenfelter et al., 2015 p344).  
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Finally, we end this section by noting that ݁௣ is a critical value for the outsiders’ prices as 
well.  That is, the post-merger prices of the outsiders are higher than their pre-merger prices if 
the level of efficiencies is on one side of ݁௣ and lower than their pre-merger counterpart on the 
other side of ݁௣.  To be more specific, if condition (21) in Proposition 3 is satisfied, the merger 
leads to lower prices for the outsiders if ݁ ൏ ݁௣ and higher prices if ݁ ൐ ݁௣.  The opposite is true 
if (21) does not hold.  
6. Consumer Welfare 
In this section, we investigate the effects of merger efficiencies on consumer welfare.  
Propositions 1 and 3 imply that larger merger efficiencies would cause the prices of both insiders 
and outsiders to rise if conditions (12) and (21) hold in the post-merger equilibrium.  In that 
scenario, merger efficiencies unambiguously reduce consumer welfare.   
However, as noted in section 3, condition (21) does not hold in the case of linear demand 
functions.  This raises the question: can conditions (12) and (21) both be satisfied in a post-
merger equilibrium?  
To answer this question, we consider a utility function that generates a system of non-linear 
demand functions and demonstrate that, under the conditions specified below, merger 
efficiencies indeed lead to higher prices for all goods and hence reduce consumer welfare.   
Specifically, suppose that the market demand functions are generated from the following 
utility function of a representative consumer: 
ݑሺܙூ, ܙைሻ ൅ ݕ ൌ ෍ߙூݍ௜
ଶ
௜ୀଵ
െ ݍଵ
ଶ
2 െ
ݍଶଶ
2 െ ߛݍଵݍଶ െ ߜݍଵ෍ݍ௜
௡
௜ୀଷ
െ ߜݍଶ෍ݍ௜
௡
௜ୀଷ
 
																																											൅෍ߙைݍ௜
௡
௜ୀଷ
൅ ߚ߬෍ݍ௜
ఛ
௡
௜ୀଷ
െ ߜ2 ቎෍ݍ௜
௡
௜ୀଷ
෍ݍ௝
௡
௝ୀଷ
െ෍ݍ௜ଶ
௡
௜ୀଷ
቏ ൅ ݕ,											ሺ26ሻ 
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where ݕ denotes the quantity of a numeraire good, ߙூ and ߙை are positive parameters, and each 
of (ߛ, ߜ, ߬) is strictly between 0 and 1.  It is easy to verify that ݑሺܙூ, ܙைሻ displays diminishing 
marginal utility.  As shown in Appendix B, moreover, ݑሺܙூ, ܙைሻ is concave in (ܙூ, ܙை) for 
quantities in the relevant range.  
Solving the utility-maximization problem associated with (26), we obtain the following 
system of inverse demand functions: 
݌ଵ ൌ ߙூ െ ݍଵ െ ߛݍଶ െ ߜ෍ݍ௝
௡
௝ୀଷ
,																					ሺ27ሻ												 
݌ଶ ൌ ߙூ െ ߛݍଵ െ ݍଶ െ ߜ෍ݍ௝
௡
௝ୀଷ
,																					ሺ28ሻ															 
݌௜ ൌ ߙ௢ ൅ ߚݍ௜ఛିଵ െ ߜ෍ ݍ௝௝ஷ௜ 	ሺ݅ ൌ 3, 4, … , ݊ሻ.															ሺ29ሻ 
The main difference between this demand system and the linear demand system (14)-(16) is that 
the demand function for each outsider is non-linear in its own quantity.  But the demand function 
for an insider remains linear, with ߛ measuring the degree of substitutability between the insiders 
and ߜ indicating the degree of substitutability between an insider and an outsider.  
In a symmetric equilibrium, (26) can be written in the form:   
ܸ ൌ 2ߙூݍூ െ ሺ1 ൅ ߛሻݍூଶ െ 2ሺ݊ െ 2ሻߜݍூݍ௢ ൅ ߙ௢ሺ݊ െ 2ሻݍ௢ ൅ ߚ߬ ሺ݊ െ 2ሻݍ௢
ఛ 
																		െ ߜ2 ሺ݊ െ 2ሻሺ݊ െ 3ሻݍ௢
ଶ െ 2݌ூݍூ െ ሺ݊ െ 2ሻ݌ைݍை.																																					ሺ30ሻ 
We use (30) to measure consumer welfare before and after the merger.   
Proposition 7. Suppose the market demand functions are represented by (27)-(29).  A larger ݁ 
leads to higher prices for the insiders if and only if  
ߛ ൏ 	 2ሺ݊ െ 2ሻߜ
ଶ
ሺ݊ െ 3ሻߜ ൅ ߬ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߚሺݍைெሻఛିଶ െ 1,																																					ሺ31ሻ 
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holds in the post-merger equilibrium. A larger ݁ unambiguously raises the prices of the 
outsiders.  Consequently, a larger ݁ reduces consumer welfare if (31) is satisfied.  
Proof. Noting that Ψூᇱ ൌ െ1, Φூᇱ ൌ െߛ, Ψைᇱ ൌ െሺ1 െ ߬ሻߚሺݍைெሻఛିଶ, Φைᇱ ൌ െߜ and Ψைᇱᇱ ൌ ሺ2 െ
߬ሻሺ1 െ ߬ሻߚሺݍைெሻఛିଷ, we rewrite (12) to find (31).  Condition (21) is satisfied because Ψைᇱ ൅
ݍைெΨ′ைᇱ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻଶߚሺݍைெሻఛିଶ ൐ 0.  Proposition 3 then implies that a larger ݁ raises the prices of 
the outsiders.  Consumer welfare falls with a larger ݁ because the indirect utility function 
associated with (26) is a decreasing function in prices ݌ூ and ݌ை.  ■ 
Therefore, larger merger efficiencies will harm consumers if condition (31) is satisfied.  As 
shown in Appendix B, a necessary condition for (31) to hold is that  
ߜ ൐ ሺ1 ൅ ߛሻ ሺ݊ െ 3ሻ2ሺ݊ െ 2ሻ.																					ሺ32ሻ 
 This is consistent with our earlier observation that merger efficiencies lead to higher prices for 
insiders if the substitutability between an insider and an outsider is high while that between the 
insiders is low.  
One drawback of (31) is that it contains an endogenous variable, ݍைெ, which itself depends on 
the values of parameters such as ߛ and ߜ.  To demonstrate clearly that there indeed exist 
parameter values for which the condition in Proposition 7 is met, we use a set of numerical 
examples.   
Specifically, we present here numerical examples for different values of ݁ with the values of 
other parameters fixed at ݊ ൌ 12, ߚ ൌ 0.14, ߛ ൌ 0.3, ߜ ൌ 0.8, ߬ ൌ 0.2, ߙூ ൌ 70, ߙை ൌ 44, and 
ܿ ൌ 1.8.  Additional technical details about the numerical simulations can be found in Appendix 
B.  Below we display two diagrams to demonstrate our main results. 
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Figure 1: Impact of Merger on Insider Prices 
Figure 1 illustrates the post-merger increase in the insider prices for ݁ ∈ ሾ0.15, 0.30ሿ.  We 
choose this range of ݁ because, on the one hand, the merger is not profitable for ݁ ൏ 0.15, and, 
on the other hand, condition (31) is violated and hence the insider prices fall with merger 
efficiencies for ݁ ൐ 0.27.   On the vertical axis of Figure 1 is the change in the prices of the 
insiders, ሺ݌ூெ െ ݌ூ஼ሻ ݌ூ஼⁄ .  From Figure 1 we see that, for ݁ in the stated range, the merger causes 
the insider prices to rise by more than 12%, and larger efficiencies push the prices to move even 
higher. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the impact of merger efficiencies on consumer welfare.  On the 
vertical axis is the change in consumer welfare, ሺܸெ െ ܸ஼ሻ ܸ஼⁄ , where ܸ஼  and ܸெ denote the 
value of (30) in pre-merger and post-merger equilibrium, respectively.  Figure 2 shows that for 
݁ ∈ ሾ0.15, 0.30ሿ the merger reduces consumer welfare by more than 19%, and larger efficiencies 
exacerbate the reduction in consumer welfare.   
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Figure 2: Impact of Merger on Consumer Welfare 
Note that among the parameter values used in the numerical examples, ߛ ൌ 0.3 and ߜ ൌ 0.8.  
That is, the degree of substitutability between the insiders is substantially smaller than that 
between an insider and an outsider.  Therefore, these examples represent a situation where the 
products offered by an insider and an outsider are very close substitutes while those offered by 
the two insiders are distant substitutes.  Moreover, the merger generates significant efficiencies in 
excess of 15%.  Yet the merger leads to substantial increase in prices and causes significant harm 
to consumers.   
7. Conclusions 
To answer the question posed in the title of this paper, merger efficiencies do not necessarily 
mitigate the price increases arising from the loss of competition.  Our analysis demonstrates that 
when firms compete in quantity, lower marginal costs after a merger can exert upward rather than 
downward pressure on the prices of the merging firms.  A policy implication of our results is that 
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in cases where firms engage in quantity competition, a competition authority can no longer 
presume that merger efficiencies will necessarily offset the anticompetitive effects of the merger.  
The merger can lead to higher prices because of, rather than despite of, large efficiencies.   
Finally, it is important to recognize that our results are obtained under a particular set of 
assumptions in a particular theoretical framework.  Among the assumptions is that firms compete 
in quantity.  If, instead, firms choose prices, the economic force that causes the insiders’ prices to 
rise with merger efficiencies may not be present.  While a formal analysis is beyond the scope of 
the present paper, it is our belief that merger efficiencies will not lead to higher prices when 
firms compete in prices.   This is because prices are, in a standard model of oligopoly, strategic 
complements.  Strategic complementarity implies that when the insiders reduce their prices in 
response to lower marginal costs, the outsiders will follow suit.  This, in turn, will reinforce the 
insiders’ incentives to cut prices.  Consequently, it appears unlikely that larger merger 
efficiencies would lead to higher prices when firms compete in price.  Therefore, a careful 
consideration of the nature of strategic interactions among firms is needed when applying our 
theory to a merger analysis.  
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Appendix A. Linear Demand System 
In this appendix, we present technical details associated with the special case of linear demand 
functions. To simplify presentation, we define ܣ ≡ ሺ݊ െ 3ሻߜ ൅ 2 and ܤ ≡ ሺ݊ െ 2ሻߜ.  Since ߜ ൏
1, it can be verified that ܣ ൐ ܤ. 
It is clear that the linear demand functions (14)-(16) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2.  Regarding 
Assumption 3, it is easy to verify that 
ܬ ൌ 2ߛሾ2 ൅ ሺ݊ െ 3ሻߜሿ ൅ 2ሺ2 െ ߜଶሻ ൅ 2ሺ݊ െ 3ሻߜሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൐ 0.						ሺܣ1ሻ 
Applying (5) to the linear demand functions, we derive the pre-merger equilibrium quantity 
of each insider and each outsider: 
ݍூ஼ ൌ ሺߙ െ ܿሻ
ሺ2 െ ߜሻ	
ሺ2 ൅ ߛሻܣ െ 2ߜܤ , ݍை
஼ ൌ ሺߙ െ ܿሻሺ2 ൅ ߛ െ 2ߜሻ	ሺ2 ൅ ߛሻܣ െ 2ߜܤ .											ሺܣ2ሻ 
Using (A2) and the demand functions (14)-(16), we obtain the equilibrium prices before the 
merger:  
݌ூ஼ ൌ ሺߙ െ ܿሻ
ሺ2 െ ߜሻ	
ሺ2 ൅ ߛሻܣ െ 2ߜܤ ൅ ܿ, 		݌ை
஼ ൌ ሺߙ െ ܿሻ	ሺ2 ൅ ߛ െ 2ߜሻሺ2 ൅ ߛሻܣ െ 2ߜܤ ൅ ܿ.				ሺܣ3ሻ 
Solving (8)-(9) for the case of linear demand functions, we find post-merger equilibrium 
quantities and prices: 
ݍூெ ൌ
ሺߙ െ ܿሻሺ2 െ ߜሻ ൅ ݁ܿܣ
2ሾሺ1 ൅ ߛሻܣ െ ߜܤሿ ,											ݍை
ெ ൌ ሺߙ െ ܿሻሺ1 ൅ ߛ െ ߜሻ െ ߜ݁ܿሺ1 ൅ ߛሻܣ െ ߜܤ ,																				ሺܣ4ሻ	
݌ூெ ൌ
ሺߙ െ ܿሻሺ1 ൅ ߛሻሺ2 െ ߜሻ െ ݁ܿሾሺ1 ൅ ߛሻܣ െ 2ߜܤሿ
2ሾሺ1 ൅ ߛሻܣ െ ߜܤሿ ൅ ܿ, ݌ைெ ൌ
ሺߙ െ ܿሻሺ1 ൅ ߛ െ ߜሻ െ ߜ݁ܿ
ሺ1 ൅ ߛሻܣ െ ߜܤ ൅ ܿ. ሺܣ5ሻ 
It is easy to verify that ߲ݍூெ ߲݁⁄ ൐ 0, ߲ݍைெ ߲݁⁄ ൏ 0, and ߲݌ைெ ߲݁⁄ ൏ 0.  Moreover, ߲݌ூெ ߲݁⁄ ൐ 0 
if and only if ሺ1 ൅ ߛሻܣ ൏ 2ߜܤ, i.e., if and only if (17) holds. 
Regarding Assumption 4, we use (A2) and (A4) to find that ݍூெ ൐ ݍூ஼ at ݁ ൌ 1 if and only if  
ܿ ൐ ሺ2 െ ߜሻߛߙሺ2 െ ߜሻߛ ൅ ሺ2 ൅ ߛሻܣ െ 2ߜܤ.																		ሺܣ6ሻ 
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Note that the right-hand side of (A6) is less than ߙ.  Thus, (A6) does not contradict ߙ ൐ ܿ.  
Appendix B.  Nonlinear Demand System 
In this appendix, we present technical details associated with the special case of the non-linear 
demand system derived from the utility function (26).  First, we present a condition that ensures 
the concavity of ݑሺܙூ, ܙைሻ.  It is easy to find  
߲ଶݑ
߲ݍ௜ଶ ൌ െ1 ൏ 0,
߲ଶݑ
߲ݍ௜߲ݍ௝ ൌ െߛ,
߲ଶݑ
߲ݍ௜߲ݍ௞ ൌ െߜ,				ሺ݅, ݆ ൌ 1,2, ݇ ൌ 3,… , ݊ሻ, ሺܣ7ሻ 
߲ଶݑ
߲ݍ௜ଶ ൌ െ
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߚݍ௜ఛିଶ ൏ 0, ߲
ଶݑ
߲ݍ௜߲ݍ௝ ൌ െߜ,									ሺ݅, ݆ ൌ 3,… , ݊ሻ.										ሺܣ8ሻ 
From (A7)-(A8), we see that ߲ଶݑ ߲ݍ௜ଶ⁄ ൏ 0 for all ݅ ൌ 1,2, … ݊.  To obtain the condition that 
ensures the concavity of ݑሺܙூ, ܙைሻ, we calculate the pivots of the Hessian matrix associated with 
the utility function (26) without row exchanges or scalar multiplications of rows.  To simplify the 
calculations, we evaluate the derivative ߲ଶݑ ߲ݍ௜ଶ⁄  at a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., at ݍ௜ ൌ ݍை for 
݅ ൌ 3,… , ݊.	  After straightfoward but tedious calculations, we can show that all pivots of the 
Hessian matrix are negative if each outsider’s quantity satisfies 
ݍை ൏ ቈ
ሺ1 ൅ ߛሻሺ1 െ ߬ሻߚ
2ሺ݊ െ 2ሻߜଶ െ ሺ1 ൅ ߛሻሺ݊ െ 3ሻߜ቉
ଵ ሺଶିఛሻ⁄
.									ሺܣ9ሻ 
The parameter values used in the numerical simulations are chosen to ensure that they satisfy 
(A9) as well as Assumptions 1-3. 
To derive condition (32), observe in (31) that 
	 2ሺ݊ െ 2ሻߜ
ଶ
ሺ݊ െ 3ሻߜ ൅ ߬ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߚሺݍைெሻఛିଶ ൏ 	
2ሺ݊ െ 2ሻߜ
ሺ݊ െ 3ሻ .														ሺܣ10ሻ 
Then (31) and (A10) imply  
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ߛ ൏ 	2ሺ݊ െ 2ሻߜሺ݊ െ 3ሻ െ 1.																																																												ሺܣ11ሻ 
We rearrange (A11) to obtain (32).  Note that the right-hand side of (32) is less than 1 because 
1 ൅ ߛ ൏ 2 and ݊ െ 3 ൏ ݊ െ 2. 
The equilibrium quantities before the merger are determined by 
ߙூ െ ሺ2 ൅ ߛሻݍூ െ ሺ݊ െ 2ሻߜݍ௢ ൌ ܿ,																									ሺܣ12ሻ 
ߙ௢ ൅ ߬ߚݍ௢ఛିଵ െ ሺ݊ െ 3ሻߜݍ଴ െ 2ߜݍூ ൌ ܿ.													ሺܣ13ሻ 
The equilibrium quantities after the merger are solved from the equation system consisting of 
ߙூ െ ሺ2 ൅ 2ߛሻݍூ െ ሺ݊ െ 2ሻߜݍ௢ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݁ሻܿ,										ሺܣ14ሻ 
and (A13).  
The numerical simulations are conducted using the following two-step procedure.  First, we 
choose a set of parameter values and solve (A12)-(A14) to find the equilibrium quantities.  Then 
we use these quantities to verify whether Assumptions 1-3 and conditions (A9) and (31) are 
satisfied.  The examples presented in section 6 are chosen from the sets of parameters that meet 
all of these restrictions.        
